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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell
I.

OBJECTIONS

Last year's evidence survey addressed and mildly criticized the
Georgia Court of Appeals holding in Garner v. Victory Express, Inc.'
that a party objecting to an opposing party's closing argument must, in
addition to objecting, state the action he wishes the court to take.2
Specifically, the objecting party must request an appropriate instruction
to the jury, a rebuke of counsel, or a mistrial. The failure to do so, the
court of appeals held in Garner,constitutes a waiver of the right to raise
that issue on appeal.3 Why, it is appropriate to ask, is it necessary to
request a mistrial when the court has overruled the objection? As
pointed out in last year's survey, this meant in Garner that plaintiff's
counsel, having seen his objection belittled by the trial court, should
4
have exacerbated the situation by futilely requesting specific relief.
The supreme court granted certiorari in Garner and, during the
current survey period, reversed the court of appeals.5 The supreme
court noted that plaintiff's attorney properly and timely objected to the
allegedly improper argument, and the trial court overruled the
objection.' The supreme court agreed that the court of appeals properly
applied, as it was bound to do, its decision in Seaboard Coastline
Railroad v. Wallace,7 requiring the objecting party to request specific

* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. 210 Ga. App. 481, 436 S.E.2d 521 (1993).
2. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 233, 234 (1994).
3. Treadwell, supra note 2, at 233-34.
4. 210 Ga. App. at 482, 436 S.E.2d at 522.
5. 264 Ga. 171, 442 S.E.2d 455 (1994).
6. Id. at 171, 442 S.E.2d at 456.
7. 227 Ga. 363, 180 S.E.2d 743 (1971).
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relief. However, the supreme court was not bound by and chose to
overrule Wallace. While a party is free to request specific relief, the
court held, it is sufficient that he merely object and "thereby implicitly
request that the trial court acknowledge the impropriety of the closing
argument by sustaining the objection thereto."' The supreme court's
decision is a victory for common sense and relieves attorneys from the
humiliating burden of, for example, beseeching a trial judge to rebuke
defense counsel when the judge has just overruled an objection to the
allegedly offensive argument.
The need for precise objections is demonstrated by two court of appeals
decisions addressing the same general issue-the admissibility of
withdrawn guilty pleas. In Shoemake v. State,9 the prosecutor asked
defendant's character witness whether she was aware that defendant
had pled guilty to the charged offense-a plea that was subsequently
withdrawn. Initially, defendant's attorney objected to the question
because it put defendant's character at issue. Defendant then took the
stand and testified about the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea
and its subsequent withdrawal. When the prosecutor examined
defendant about the plea, defendant's counsel again objected, arguing
that the withdrawn plea was irrelevant. At the close of the evidence,
defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the plea negotiations
should be treated just as civil settlement negotiations and should not be
admissible."°

Defendant's attorney apparently was unaware that Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 17-7-93(b) specifically provides
that withdrawn pleas are not "admissible as evidence against [defendant] at his trial."' The court of appeals ruled that defendant's initial
objection-that the evidence improperly impugned her character-was
without merit because defendant had placed her character in issue by
calling a character witness. Defendant did not specifically assert that
the denial of her motion for mistrial was error and, even if she had, the
court observed that "the timeliness of the motion is questionable"
because it was made after the close of evidence.' 3 Thus, defendant's
counsel simply failed to preserve for appeal a meritorious objection to the

8. 264 Ga. at 172, 442 S.E.2d at 456.

9. 213 Ga. App. 528, 445 S.E.2d 558 (1994).
10. Id. at 528-29, 445 S.E.2d at 558-59.
11. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93(b) (1990).
12. 213 Ga. App. at 529, 445 S.E.2d at 559.
13. Id.
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admission of evidence about his client's withdrawn guilty plea.
Fortunately for defendant, the court of appeals accepted the argument
that the admission of the plea was an error "of such serious magnitude
that even if she erred procedurally in the manner and timeliness of
pursuing it, a new trial is required." 4 The court apparently was
swayed by its suspicion that the prosecutor knowingly violated the
statute. 5 Judge Andrews, joined by Judge Birdsong, argued in dissent
that the "objection made was not good and the objection now argued and
addressed by the majority was never made below.""6
Judge Andrews returned to this issue in Snow v.State. 7 In Snow,
defendant contended that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
defendant's attempt to plead guilty to the charged offense in magistrate
court at an initial hearing and of his subsequent withdrawal of his
plea.'" However, defendant's counsel did not make a "specific objection
to such testimony" but, rather, only objected generally to "'any statement' with respect to [defendant's] testimony about the circumstances
under which his previous statements were made .

. .

. "'" Writing for

an undivided panel, Judge Andrews concluded that defendant's
objections were insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.2" In a
special concurrence, Judge Beasley differed with Judge Andrews'
reasoning, but reached the same result.2 ' She concluded that O.C.G.A.
section 17-7-93 did not apply to defendant's statements in his initial
appearance in the 2magistrate
court. Judge Beasley cited, but did not
3
discuss, Shoemake.
Motions in limine are frequently used by attorneys to resolve
evidentiary issues prior to trial. The question often arises whether the
grant or denial of a motion in limine preserves an issue for appeal or
whether it is necessary to object again during the trial. In General
Motors Corp. v. Moseley,24 the court of appeals held that "where the
trial court's ruling on a motion in limine is violated, further objection at
trial is unnecessary to preserve the matter for appellate review."25

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 531, 445 S.E.2d at 560 (Andrews & Birdsong, JJ., dissenting).
213 Ga. App. 571, 445 S.E.2d 353 (1994).
Id. at 571, 445 S.E.2d at 353.
Id.
Id., 445 S.E.2d at 354.
Id. at 573, 445 S.E.2d at 355 (Beasley, P.J., concurring specially).
Id.
Id. See 213 Ga. App. 528, 445 S.E.2d 558.
213 Ga. App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302 (1994).
Id. at 877, 447 S.E.2d at 306.
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Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence
Perhaps the most problematic area of evidence law is the determination of the relevancy of extrinsic act evidence. Certainly, Georgia's
appellate courts address this issue more than any other evidentiary
issue. Evidence is extrinsic when it concerns conduct on occasions other
than the one at issue. As a general rule, extrinsic act evidence is
inadmissible. Like the rule against hearsay, however, the rule against
extrinsic act evidence is known more for its exceptions than its flat
prohibition. Extrinsic act evidence may be admissible for a substantive
purpose, as when a prosecutor tenders evidence of a similar transaction,
usually a prior criminal offense, to prove a defendant's motive to commit
the charged offense. Extrinsic act evidence also may be admissible to
impeach or bolster a witness, as when evidence of a felony conviction is
tendered to impeach a witness's character. However, evidence which
may appear to be extrinsic may not, in the sometimes arcane world of
evidence, actually be extrinsic. For example, as discussed below, the res
gestae doctrine, although typically thought of as an exception to the rule
against hearsay, is often used to admit evidence of transactions or
conduct other than the precise conduct or evidence at issue.
For years, Georgia courts routinely and liberally admitted evidence of
similar, but totally unrelated transactions in criminal cases. However,
as discussed in previous surveys, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Stephens v. State 6 and Williams v. State"7 substantially tightened the
rules governing the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence in criminal
cases. 8 In Stephens, the supreme court held that the prosecution
cannot rely solely on a certified copy of a prior conviction when seeking
to use that conviction as similar transaction evidence.29 Rather, the
prosecution must offer evidence proving the' requisite degree of similarity
or connection between the extrinsic act and the charged offense.3" In
Williams, the supreme court, in a dramatic departure from prior
practice, held that the prosecution must prove, prior to trial, three
elements before similar transaction evidence can be admitted.3 1 First,
A.

26. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
27. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
28. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 231 (1994); Evidence, 44
MERCER L. REV. 213, 216-20 (1993).

29. 261 Ga. at 469, 409 S.E.2d at 486.
30. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 485-86.
31. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
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the prosecution must prove the relevance of the independent transaction
to a legitimate issue.3 2 Second, the prosecution must prove the
defendant committed the independent offense or act."3 Third, the
prosecution must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the
independent transaction and the charged offense.' The trial court
must make a specific determination that the prosecution has carried its
burden of proving each of the three elements,
During the present survey period, the court of appeals struggled
mightily with Williams' procedural requirements and the failure of trial
courts to comply with those requirements. The results of this struggle
have not been uniformly consistent. The court of appeals in White v.
State"6 reaffirmed its holding in Riddle v. State" that a defendant
does not waive his right to appeal the trial court's failure to conduct the
hearing required by Williams (and subsequently by Uniform Superior
Court Rule 31.3) when he does not object at trial to this omission.3"
The burden of conducting the hearing is placed solely on the prosecution
and the trial court, and the defendant has no responsibility to request
a hearing. 39 Thus, a defendant's failure to object to the admission of
similar transaction evidence on the basis that the hearing was not
conducted does not constitute a waiver of his objection. However, in
Willis v. State,4 ° the court of appeals rejected defendant's contention
that the trial court, although it conducted a Williams hearing, failed to
required by Williams because defendant failed to
make the findings
41
object at trial.
In Banks v. State,4 2 the court of appeals considered the substantive
issues raised by the admission of similar transaction evidence and, in a
rare move, concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the
evidence.43 In Banks, the prosecution alleged defendant and an
accomplice entered the home of an eighty-three year old man and, while
attempting to rob him, assaulted him. The trial court admitted evidence
of Banks' conviction for kidnapping a fifty-seven year old woman from

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. 213 Ga. App. 429, 445 S.E.2d 309 (1994).
37. 208 Ga. App. 8, 430 S.E.2d 153 (1993).
38. 213 Ga. App. at 430, 445 S.E.2d at 311.
39. Id. (quoting Riddle, 208 Ga. App. at 11, 430 S.E.2d at 156).
40. 214 Ga. App. 479, 448 S.E.2d 223 (1994).

41. Id. at 481, 448 S.E.2d at 225-26.
42, 216 Ga. App. 326, 454 S.E.2d 784 (1995).
43. Id. at 328, 454 S.E.2d at 787.
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a parking lot, stealing her purse, and forcing her into the trunk of her
car. The trial court concluded that this prior offense was admissible to
prove defendant's motive and intent to commit the charged offense."
However, the court of appeals disagreed that the two offenses were
sufficiently similar that proof of the first proved the second.45 In
addition, and this could provide defense attorneys with a powerful
weapon to prevent the admission of similar transaction evidence, the
court noted that neither motive nor intent was in issue.4
Rather,
defendant contended that he did not commit the offense, not that
he
47
committed the offense but lacked the requisite motive or intent.
Prosecutors have often taken advantage of the principle that if the
date of an alleged offense is not an essential averment of an indictment,
then the State may prove any similar offenses allegedly committed
within the statute of limitations. Such evidence is not extrinsic, but
rather is direct evidence of the charged offense. In Robinson v. State,4s
the court of appeals held that this principle is not without limitations.49
If the indictment charges that the offense was committed in a specific
manner, and the similar offense was committed in a different manner,
then the similar offense is not admissible as direct evidence of the
offense charged.5 ° Because the indictment in Robinson charged that
defendant committed child molestation in a specific manner, and the
allegedly similar act of molestation was committed in a different
manner, the court held that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of the similar offense. 51
The admissibility of extrinsic act evidence is also frequently an issue
in civil cases. However, and perhaps incongruously, courts are much
more willing to admit extrinsic act evidence in criminal cases than in
civil cases. Some, no doubt, would argue that courts should be more
reluctant to admit highly prejudicial extrinsic act evidence in criminal
cases, where life and freedom are at stake, than in civil cases. There is,
however, some logic to this disparate treatment. Civil cases typically do
not involve issues of intent, motive, scheme, or other issues that are in
play in cases involving intentional misconduct. Rather, civil cases

44. Id. at 326-28, 454 S.E.2d at 786-87.
45. Id. at 328, 454 S.E.2d at 787.
46. Id.

47. Id. at 326, 454 S.E.2d at 784. This argument is not available to defense attorneys
in federal criminal proceedings. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV.
1451, 1457 (1990); Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1173, 1175-76 (1991).
48. 213 Ga. App. 577, 445 S.E.2d 564 (1994).

49. Id. at 577, 445 S.E.2d at 565.
50. Id. at 578, 445 S.E.2d at 565.
51. Id.
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typically involve situations in which the degree of intent is much less
than in criminal cases, certainly much less malevolent, and is often
completely absent-such as in a typical negligence case. For example,
evidence of a prior automobile accident in a negligence case involving an
unrelated subsequent accident would serve only to prove the improper
and prejudicial point that a defendant, because of negligence on a prior
occasion, was more likely negligent on the occasion at issue. In a
criminal case, on the other hand, evidence of a prior burglary involving
facts similar to the charged offense may tend to prove the defendant's
motive, intent, or plan in committing the charged offense. If so, the
prosecutor is not using the prior transaction to show a defendant's
proclivity toward criminal conduct (criminal defense lawyers, no doubt,
scoff at this notion), but is presenting the evidence as relevant to the
legitimate issue of motive, intent, or plan.
Generally, the principles governing the admissibility of extrinsic act
evidence are the same for both criminal and civil cases. Evidence of
similar or related transactions is not admissible to prove that a person
acted in conformity with some prior conduct, but may be admissible to
prove identity, motive, plans, scheme, bent of mind, notice or course of
conduct, all of which are not relevant issues in a typical civil negligence
case.
During the survey period, the court of appeals demonstrated the
applicability of this principle in Matt v. Days Inns of America, Inc.52
In Matt, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment in the plaintiffs' action to recover for injuries suffered when
one was shot while a guest at defendant's notel. The plaintiffs alleged
that defendant was negligent because it failed to provide adequate
security and argued that the criminal attack was foreseeable by virtue
of prior criminal activity at the motel. Although the plaintiffs adduced
considerable evidence of such prior criminal activity on the motel's
premises and in the areas immediately surrounding the motel, the trial
court ruled that these acts were not sufficiently similar to the attack on
the plaintiffs to provide notice to defendant that such an attack was
possible.5 3 A majority of the court of appeals held that the trial court
viewed these prior incidents much too restrictively.5' It is not necessary, the majority reasoned, that the prior criminal acts be identical or
virtually identical.55 The issue is not whether the defendant had
reason to believe that a gun would be used in an attack, which would

52. 212 Ga. App. 792, 443 S.E.2d 290 (1994) cert. granted.
53. Id. at 793, 443 S.E.2d at 292.
54. Id. at 795, 443 S.E.2d at 293.
55. Id. at 794, 443 S.E.2d at 293.
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make only prior offenses involving guns admissible, but "whether the
prior crimes should have put an ordinarily prudent person on notice that
the hotel's guests were facing increased risks."56 The majority criticized
the two dissenting judges' restrictive test for admissibility by terming it
a "'free bite' analysis" that would absolve a landowner of any responsibility for an attack by a gunman because the perpetrators of the prior
criminal offenses wielded knives.57 The court of appeals formulated a
straightforward test for determining the admissibility of evidence of
prior criminal activity: "The test is whether the prior criminal activity
was sufficiently substantially similar to demonstrate the landowner's
knowledge that conditions on his property subjected his invitees to
unreasonable risk of criminal attack so that the landowner had
reasonable grounds to apprehend that the present criminal act was
foreseeable."58

Before defense lawyers become too concerned about the use of extrinsic
59
act evidence in civil cases, they should read Browning v. Paccar,Inc.
In Browning, plaintiffs contended that a truck manufactured by
defendant was defective because the configuration of the truck's fuel and
electrical systems increased the possibility of fire after a collision. On
appeal of a verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiffs argued that the trial
court erred in denying their motion in limine to prohibit the defense
from referring to the fact that the truck had never been subjected to a
recall. The plaintiffs relied on the general principle that whether a
defendant was negligent or not negligent on a prior occasion is irrelevant
to the issue of whether a defendant was negligent on the occasion in
issue.6 ° For example, it is impermissible for a doctor defending a
malpractice claim to proclaim that he has never been sued before.6 1
The court of appeals was not persuaded. Because plaintiffs were arguing
that defendant's truck suffered a design defect that, by definition, would
be common to thousands of trucks, "[tihe fact that none of such vehicles
had been subjected to recall and Paccar had never been subjected to
regulatory action with respect to the claimed defect despite the
thousands of identical vehicles in use, tends to negate the allegation that
the configuration was a dangerous design . "
The court's holding is significant and is arguably a substantial
departure from present law. Typically, similar transaction evidence is
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 795, 443 S.E.2d at 293.
Id.
214 Ga. App. 496, 448 S.E.2d 260 (1994).
Id. at 496-97, 448 S.E.2d at 262.
Williams v. Naidu, 168 Ga. App. 539, 540, 309 S.E.2d 686, 686 (1983).
214 Ga. App. at 498, 448 S.E.2d at 263.
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admissible to prove what has been described as a "legitimate issue;" for
example, the intent or motive of a criminal defendant or, in a civil case,
the knowledge of a party. Similar transaction evidence is not admissible, however, to prove that a defendant is guilty simply because he
committed a prior criminal act or to prove that a party is negligent
simply because he was negligent on prior occasions. In Browning,
however, the absence of prior incidents was admissible to prove that
defendant was not culpable in the transaction at issue.63
The court of appeals' decision in Garner v. Victory Express, Inc.'
involves a more traditional application of the principles governing the
admissibility of similar transaction evidence in civil cases. In Garner,
defendant's counsel said in closing argument that there was no evidence
that defendant was not a safe, careful, and prudent driver.65 Of course,
even if there was such evidence, it would be inadmissible unless it was
relevant to a legitimate issue. Just as the admission of a driver's past
driving record is reversible error, an argument about the lack of such
The court of appeals reversed the judgment
evidence is also improper.
66
in defendant's favor.
B. Relevancy of PriorSexual Conduct
Generally, evidence of a child's past sexual history is inadmissible in
the trial of a defendant charged with molesting the child.67 However,
in Chambers v. State,68 the court of appeals reaffirmed that the State
may open the door to admission of such testimony when it calls an
expert witness to testify that the victim has many of the common
characteristics of a sexually abused child.69 In Chambers, the trial
court refused to admit evidence that the victim had engaged in sexual
activities with others during the time that the victim claimed defendant
sexually molested her.7 0 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding
that this evidence could suggest other possible causes for the behavior
and symptoms that led the prosecution's expert to conclude that the
child had been molested.7 1 Thus, the evidence was relevant to prove
that the child was molested by someone other than defendant.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 496, 448 S.E.2d at 260.
214 Ga. App. 652, 448 S.E.2d 719 (1994).
Id. at 652, 448 S.E.2d at 720.
Id. at 653, 448 S.E.2d at 721.
See Marion v. State, 206 Ga. App. 159, 159, 424 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1992).
213 Ga. App. 284, 444 S.E.2d 833 (1994).
Id. at 286, 444 S.E.2d at 835.
Id.
Id.
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Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction. 72 The
court, however, did not address the fact that the sexual conduct in
question was apparently consensual and what effect, if any, this would
have on an expert's conclusion that the child had many of the common
characteristics of a sexually abused child. 7' Apparently, it was
sufficient for the court that the child had engaged in sexual activities
74
with others, regardless of whether she had participated voluntarily.
C. Relevancy of Insurance Coverage
In Conley v. Gallup,75 plaintiff alleged the trial court erred when it
refused to allow cross-examination of defendant's experts concerning the
fact that the experts were insured by or closely related to defendant's
malpractice carrier. The trial court also prohibited plaintiff from crossexamining a defense witness about a prior inconsistent statement
concerning his knowledge that defendant was insured by the insurance
carrier and that defendant was represented by an attorney employed by
the insurance carrier.7' The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that
a plaintiff's right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination must yield
to the rule that matters relating to insurance coverage are irrelevant.7 7
To the extent the witness's association with the malpractice carrier
constituted a financial interest in the case, it was not of such a nature
that would warrant the introduction and the ensuing prejudice of
evidence that defendant had liability insurance coverage.7"
D. Relevancy of Habit
In Horton v. Eaton,79 plaintiffs alleged that defendant, a radiologist,
negligently failed to diagnose a cervical fracture. Defendant maintained
that his reading of X-ray films was within the applicable standard of
care, but defendant's expert acknowledged that defendant should have
performed additional studies if the patient was complaining of neck pain.
Unfortunately, the X-ray requisition form which may or may not have
contained this critical information "mysteriously" disappeared from
defendant's records.8 ' Thus, the critical issue in the case was whether

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 287, 444 SE.2d at 836.
Id. at 284, 444 S.E.2d at 833.
See id.
213 Ga. App. 487, 445 S.E.2d 275 (1994).

76. Id. at 487, 445 S.E.2d at 276.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 488, 445 S.E.2d at 276.
215 Ga. App. 803, 452 S.E.2d 541 (1994).
Id. at 805, 452 S.E.2d at 544.
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the requisition form informed defendant that the patient was experiencing neck pain. The trial court allowed defendant to testify, based upon
his knowledge of the manner in which requisition forms were typically
filled in, that the requisition form in question did not contain any
information suggesting that plaintiff was experiencing neck pain."1
On appeal from a judgment in defendant's favor, the court of appeals
first noted that the absence of the requisition form was not fatal to the
plaintiffs' case because O.C.G.A. section 24-4-22 allows a jury to infer
that missing evidence may create a presumption against the party in
control of the evidence. 2 Thus, jurors could have inferred that the
missing form indicated plaintiff was experiencing neck pains. Conversely, defendant's failure to produce the requisition form (the court
apparently thought that the absence of this critical document was not
accidental) meant he had no evidence to support his defense that he
acted properly given the information available to him. But the missing
requisition form became a benefit rather than a burden to defendant
because the trial court allowed him to speculate as to the contents of the
document. The court of appeals interpreted this as testimony by
defendant as to the habit and customs of another, testimony that is
clearly improper under Georgia law, which only permits a witness to
testify with regard to his own habits and customs. 3 Thus, the court
reversed the trial court.'
E. Relevancy of Subsequent Remedial Measures
In General Motors Corp. v. Moseley,' a highly publicized product
liability action, the court of appeals addressed an issue of first impression concerning the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. In Moseley, the trial court denied defendant's motion in
limine to prevent any references to the redesign of its vehicle. Plaintiffs
argued that the redesign was not a subsequent remedial measure
because the redesign process began prior to the manufacture of the
subject vehicle and, in fact, a redesigned model was manufactured prior
to the incident giving rise to plaintiffs' suit. In other words, plaintiffs
argued that the prohibition against evidence of subsequent remedial
measures should apply only to measures undertaken subsequent to an
injury 86 The court rejected this argument.8 7 The court reasoned that

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 806, 452 S.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 805, 452 S.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 806, 452 S.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 807, 452 S.E.2d at 545.
213 Ga. App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302 (1994).
Id. at 881, 447 S.E.2d at 309.
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because vehicle design changes require years to implement, the policy
concerns addressed by the rule-that subsequent remedial measures
may be taken as an admission of liability-are present even though the
corrective measures began years before the injury.8 8 This conclusion
is questionable. While the redesign of a faulty product should be
encouraged, it is difficult to see how a redesign that is implemented
prior to an injury can be characterized as a subsequent remedial
measure. On the contrary, it would seem that such conduct is evidence
of notice to the manufacturer of the defective design of its product and,
because of such notice, the manufacturer should take additional steps to
protect the public from harm. While it is true that the redesign of the
product may take years, the manufacturer can also protect the public
through other measures that have a more immediate result, such as a
recall of the product.
The significance and impact of this conclusion may be muted
somewhat by an issue of first impression resolved by the court of appeals
in Moseley. Plaintiffs argued that the rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be restricted to
negligence actions and should not be applied in strict liability actions.89
The court agreed, siding with other jurisdictions that allow evidence of
subsequent remedial measures because it is unlikely that a manufacturer will be deterred from improving a product that has caused an injury
when the failure to do so will subject the manufacturer to multiple
claims by others subsequently injured by a defective product.'
Moreover, the court noted that even in negligence actions, the rule is
subject to numerous exceptions.9" For example, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures may be admitted if it demonstrates prior knowledge
92
of a defect, causation, or the feasibility of repair or modification.
Thus, the court held that subsequent remedial measures may be
admissible in strict liability cases.93 In cases in which a plaintiff
alleges both negligence and strict liability, the court concluded that the
jury must be properly instructed with regard to the proper use and
limits of such evidence and, in appropriate cases, the trial court should
bifurcate the proceeding.'

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.'
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 881-82, 447 S.E.2d at 309.
Id. at 882, 447 S.E.2d at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 883, 447 S.E.2d at 310.
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Miscellaneous Relevancy Issues
In Morris v. State,95 the prosecutor, in her opening statement, said
that a key witness and alleged accomplice of defendant underwent a
polygraph examination and that he either "checked out" or "checked out
okay.""6 This witness later testified that he had taken two lie detector
tests. On both occasions, the trial court denied defendant's motions for
mistrial.97 On appeal, the court of appeals began its analysis by
acknowledging the general rule that evidence concerning a witness or
party who has undergone a polygraph test is generally not relevant.9 8
The court rejected, with some apparent disdain, the argument that the
statement that the witness's polygraph examination had "checked out"
was not sufficient to infer the results of the examination.99 The mere
mention that a witness has taken a polygraph examination, the court
said, has been held sufficient to create the impression that the witness
took and passed the test.'0 0 The court also rejected the State's argument that evidence of the polygraph test was relevant to explain why the
police did not consider the witness a suspect. 10 ' The court acknowledged that evidence that a witness has taken a polygraph test may be
admissible to explain conduct or motive if that witness's conduct or
motive are in issue.'0 2 However, the court did not think the conduct
and motive of the police were relevant issues. 0 3
III.

PRIVILEGE

Peters,1°4

In State v.
the court of appeals, addressing an issue of first
impression, held that the marital testimonial privilege may be asserted
notwithstanding the fact that the marriage was entered into for the
purpose of preventing the spouse from testifying.0 5 In Peters, the
State's case against the defendant for the murder of her husband
depended upon the testimony of defendant's paramour. The State
intended to secure his cooperation by granting him immunity. However,

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

264 Ga. 823, 452 S.E.2d 100 (1995).
Id. at 824, 452 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 825, 452 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 824, 452 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 825, 452 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
213 Ga. App. 352, 444 S.E.2d 609 (1994).
Id. at 356-57, 444 S.E.2d at 612. See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-23 (1995).
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defendant and her lover married the day before the hearing on the
State's motion to grant immunity. Prior to the marriage, defendant told
her daughters that she intended to marry her lover so he could not be
compelled to testify against her. The trial court quashed the State's
subpoena of the lover, and the State appealed.'0 6
The court of appeals noted that the marital privilege is clear and
unambiguous: "Husband and wife shall be competent but shall not be
compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against
each other."'0 7 Short of a judicial revision of the statute, the court of
appeals found that it could reach no conclusion other than to affirm the
trial court's ruling."0 8 The court of appeals acknowledged the State's
argument that "'[t]he object of all legal investigation is the discovery of
truth.""0 " Certainly, the marital privilege, like any privilege, necessarily impedes the discovery of truth."0 However, that is a judgment
made by the legislature based upon what it perceives to be the importance of the marital relationship."' Because the legislature made such
a judgment, the court of appeals was obligated to respect it." 2
In General Motors Corp. v. Moseley,"' a case discussed in more
detail above, plaintiffs relied upon the testimony of an engineer, formerly
employed by defendant, who had considerable knowledge of the alleged
defect in defendant's vehicle and who had worked with defendant's
lawyers in the defense of other cases involving the vehicle design.
Defendant contended that this witness's testimony should have been
14
excluded in its entirety pursuant to the attorney-client privilege.
The court of appeals disagreed. The court noted that the engineer did
not testify as an expert witness, but testified concerning his knowledge
of the defendant's product."' His knowledge did not become privileged
merely because he worked with defendant's lawyers." 6 "'It is axiomatnot
ic that one cannot render privileged that which is otherwise
17
privileged merely by placing it in the hands of his attorney.'

106. 213 Ga. App. at 353-54, 444 S.E.2d at 610-11.
107. Id. at 356-57, 444 S.E.2d at 612.
108. Id.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 356, 444 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-1-2 (1995)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
213 Ga. App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302.
Id. at 878-79, 447 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 879, 447 S.E.2d at 308.
Id.

117. Id. at 880, 447 S.E.2d at 308 (quoting Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. Daugherty,
111 Ga. App. 144, 150, 141 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1965)).
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WITNESSES

A.

Impeachment by Evidence of Character
In DeLoach v. State,11 defendant called several witnesses to attest
to his good character. The prosecutor asked one of these witnesses
whether the witness knew that defendant had been convicted of a crime.
When the witness said that he did not, the prosecutor then tendered,
and the court admitted a certified copy of defendant's conviction for child
abandonment. The trial court admitted the conviction as a crime
involving moral turpitude and, thus, admissible to impeach general
character. Defendant appealed, contending that the conviction was not
admissible because child abandonment is not a crime of moral turpitude." 9 The court of appeals agreed and reversed defendant's conviction.12
However, the court of appeals acknowledged that when a
defendant puts his character in issue, the State may cross-examine
character witnesses offered by defendant to test their knowledge of his
character.2 1 Indeed, in Chisholm v. State,'2 2 the court held that the
prosecution could cross-examine character witnesses about their
knowledge of defendant's commission of particular crimes or even about
whether the witnesses were aware the defendant had been investigated
for a crime." 3 In DeLoach, the court of appeals did not address
whether the prosecution's questions to 24
defendant's character witnesses
were appropriate under this principle.1
V.

OPINION TESTIMONY

The court of appeals decision in Newberry v. D.R. Horton, Inc.125 is

difficult to understand, but it arguably creates a de facto requirement
that a party tender an expert and obtain a clear ruling from the trial
judge that the party is qualified to give opinion testimony as an expert
witness, a requirement not previously found in Georgia law? 26 In
Newberry, plaintiffs alleged defendant negligently constructed their
home. In support of their claim they called a witness who, after stating

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

216 Ga. App. 161, 453 S.E.2d 766 (1995).
Id. at 161, 453 S.E.2d at 767.
Id. at 163, 453 S.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 162, 453 S.E.2d at 767.
199 Ga. App. 746, 406 S.E.2d 112 (1991).
Id. at 746-47, 406 S.E.2d at 113.
See 216 Ga. App. at 161, 453 S.E.2d at 766.
215 Ga. App. 858, 452 S.E.2d 560 (1994).
See id.
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his experience in the construction industry, testified that plaintiffs'
house contained numerous flaws in workmanship. This witness also
testified concerning the remedies for these defects and the cost of the
remedies. Defendant did not object to this testimony and did not
challenge the witness's credentials. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the trial court directed a verdict for defendant on plaintiffs' negligent
construction claim on the ground that plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence
breached the standard of care required of a professional
that defendant
12 7
builder.

In response to the plaintiffs' argument that they did offer expert
testimony, the court of appeals noted that this witness "was never
tendered by plaintiffs as an expert, and the trial court never ruled on his
qualifications to give expert testimony."2 ' The court of appeals
concluded that the trial court "implicitly rejected the witness as an
expert by directing a verdict for defendant on plaintiffs' negligent
construction claim."" Judge McMurray, joined by Judge Blackburn,
dissented, arguing that the witness's testimony was sufficient to raise a
jury issue with regard to whether defendant breached the requisite
standard of care and that because defendant did not object to this
testimony, the testimony was admissible.'
There is no explicit requirement under Georgia law that a party
"tender an expert" or obtain a court's ruling that a witness is qualified
to testify as an expert.' 3 ' Indeed, Judge Andrews has maintained, and
many trial lawyers would agree, that tendering an expert in the
presence of the jury is improper because a trial court's ruling that a
witness is an expert may create the impression that the trial court
agrees with the substance of the expert's testimony. 32 Indeed, it is
safe to say that most lawyers who tender a witness as an expert are
fully aware that the witness possesses the credentials to qualify as an
expert and yet make the tender for precisely this purpose."' The
conventional thinking, as suggested by the dissent in Newberry, is that
it is incumbent upon the opposing party to attack or object to a professed

127. Id. at 858-59, 452 S.E.2d at 560-61.
128. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 561.
129. Id. at 859, 452 S.E.2d at 562.
130. Id. at 860, 452 S.E.2d at 563 (McMurray, P.J., Blackburn, J., concurring and
dissenting).
131. See generally Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 572, 574, 434 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1993).
132. Id. at 576 n.2, 434 S.E.2d at 135 n.2 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
133. Davis presents a situation in which this ploy apparently backfired. See 209 Ga.
App. 572, 434 S.E.2d 132.

1995]

EVIDENCE

expert's credentials and qualifications."M Nevertheless, Newberry can
be interpreted to stand for the proposition that caution requires a party
to seek affirmatively a trial court's ruling that an expert witness is, in
fact, an expert.
For a number of years, the author has attempted to catalogue the
numerous cases in which the courts have struggled with the issue of
whether expert testimony is admissible in criminal cases to prove or
disprove that a child was sexually abused and, more recently, that a
defendant was not a pedophile. Because the struggle emanated from two
apparently conflicting supreme court decisions, State v. Butler"5 and
Allison v. State,"6 the author has referred to this as the Butler/Allison
During the present survey, the Butler/Allison debate
debate.'37
reappeared, this time in the context of a commentary by Judge Andrews
in a specially concurring opinion. In Gilstrap v. State,"38 the court of
appeals summarily rejected defendant's contention that the trial court
erred in not allowing his expert to render an opinion on whether he fit
the profile of a pedophile."' Judge Andrews, although agreeing that
the testimony was inadmissible, wrote that he could see little difference
between expert testimony regarding abused child syndrome, which is
admissible, and expert testimony that a defendant does or does not fit
the profile of a pedophile. 4 ° Judge Andrews lamented the efforts to
bring "'soft science,'" such as battered wife syndrome, abused child
syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, and even urban survival
syndrome into the courtroom. 4' Judge Andrews acknowledged that it
seems unfair that evidence of victim syndromes is admissible, but
evidence of perpetrator syndromes is not: "it is difficult to explain why
we should put stock in psychological evaluation and opinion with regard
to syndromes pertaining to victims, yet extend no credence to syndromes
or profiles relating to offenders." 4" Unfortunately, Judge Andrews
continued, the supreme court has opened the door and the court of
appeals has no power to close it."" Rather, "the best we can do is to
continue to screen out other dubious syndromes as they are imagined

134.

215 Ga. App. at 860,452 S.E.2d at 562 (McMurray, P.J., Blackburn, J., dissenting

and concurring).
135. 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
136.

256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 242, 243 (1993).
215 Ga. App. 180, 450 S.E.2d 436 (1994) (Andrews, J., concurring).
Id. at 184, 450 S.E.2d at 439.
Id. at 183, 450 S.E.2d at 439.
Id.

142. Id. at 181, 450 S.E.2d at 439.
143. Id. at 184, 450 S.E.2d at 439.
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by individuals who need to explain away their conand promoted
144
duct.

Perhaps consistent with Judge Andrews' disdain for soft science, the
court of appeals held in Roberson v. State4 5 that the trial court erred
when it permitted a prosecution witness, a clinical social worker, to
testify that the victim in a child molestation case understood the
difference between the truth and a lie and the consequences of lying. 146
The court held that this amounted to an "improper bolstering of the
victim's credibility." 47
In ChandlerExterminators,Inc. v. Morris,4 8 the supreme court held
that a neuropsychologist is not qualified to testify regarding causation
of physiological problems.'4 9 As a result of this ruling, the General
Assembly amended O.C.G.A. section 43-39-1 to provide that the practice
of psychology includes "diagnosing and treating mental and nervous
disorders and illnesses, [and) rendering opinions concerning diagnoses
of mental disorders, including organic brain disorders and brain
In Drake v. LaRue Construction Co.,' the State Board
damage.""
of Workers' Compensation concluded this statute could not be applied
because it became effective subsequent to the hearing.'52 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the statute, because it "concerns15 3a rule of
evidence, which is procedural," could be applied retroactively.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' ' the United
States Supreme Court, in a dramatic departure from prior practice,
overruled Frye v. United States,' rejecting the longstanding Frye test
for determining whether novel or experimental test procedures for other
matters that are the subject matter of expert testimony have become
sufficiently established to be admissible in court.156 In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh,'57 defendant sought to rely on the more
restrictive Daubert test to exclude plaintiff's expert testimony."' The

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
214 Ga. App. 208, 447 S.E.2d 640 (1994).
Id. at 210, 447 S.E.2d at 643.
Id.
262 Ga. 257, 416 S.E.2d 277 (1992).
Id. at 259, 416 S.E.2d at 278.
O.C.G.A. § 43-39-1 (1994).
215 Ga. App. 453, 451 S.E.2d 792 (1994).

152. Id. at 456, 451 S.E.2d at 794.
153.

Id.

154.
155.
156.
157.

113 S. Ct, 2786 (1993).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
113 S.Ct. at 2790.
215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159 (1994).

158. Id. at 592, 452 S.E.2d at 165.
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court of appeals refused to adopt the Daubert test and reaffirmed the
test traditionally applied by Georgia courts,"5 9 which is dependent
upon a determination that the evidence in question has reached a
"scientific stage of verifiable certainty."6 '
VI. HEARSAY
A.

Res Gestae
Anyone who tells you they understand the res gestae doctrine is likely
telling you a lie. The doctrine is, as held by the supreme court, an
inexplicable enigma.16' Anyone taking the time (wasting their time?)
to review recent res gestae decisions will easily conclude they yield no
rational legal principles. However, and with tongue in cheek, some
irrational conclusions may be drawn. First, res gestae evidence is
almost never admissible in civil cases. 62 This most definitely is not
a legal principle, but it is undoubtedly a practical one. Second, the res
gestae doctrine almost always permits the admission of hearsay in
criminal cases. 63 Thus, appellate courts routinely affirm police officer
testimony about statements made by witnesses incriminating a criminal
defendant and yet are loathe to allow a police officer in, for example, a
routine intersection collision case, to offer similar testimony.'
No
doubt there are some who find these principles somewhat incongruous.
They would argue that courts should be more circumspect in admitting
hearsay evidence in criminal cases than in civil cases.
The court of appeals decision in Wilbourne v. State 65 stands as a
glaring exception to principle number two. In Wilbourne, the trial court
admitted, through the testimony of a police officer, the statement of an
alleged beating victim. The police officer arrived at defendant's house
approximately three and one-half hours after an alleged altercation
between defendant and the alleged victim. The victim, who had been
drinking and was bruised and disheveled, told the officer that defendant
had beaten her head against the floor. This testimony was the only
evidence offered by the State against defendant. Defendant was

159. Id.
160. Manley v. State, 206 Ga. App. 281, 281, 424 S.E.2d 818, 819 (1992) (quoting

Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982)).
161. Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 225, 290 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1982).
162. See, e.g., Lee v. Peacock, 199 Ga. App. 192, 404 S.E.2d 473 (1991).
163. See, e.g., Wilbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 448 S.E.2d 37 (1994).
164. Id.
165. 214 Ga. App. 371, 448 S.E.2d 37 (1994).
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convicted and, on appeal, argued that the166 trial court erroneously
admitted the victim's out of court statement.
The court of appeals agreed. 1 7 The res gestae doctrine, the court
noted, applies only to declarations that are "free from all suspicion of
device or afterthought."16 8 If a statement is "spontaneous or so
connected to the act as to be inherently reliable," it may be admitted
under the res gestae doctrine. 169 The length of time between the event
and the statement is a factor in determining the spontaneity of the
statement, but it is not conclusive. 170 The court noted that the victim's
statement was not made at the scene of the fight, but rather while
defendant was outside the house.17 Moreover, she was upset and had
been drinking.172 The court held that the "evidence was created hours
after the occurrence and bears no mark of 'spontaneity' or other such
state of mind undeniably free of conscious device or afterthought ....
"173

The supreme court's decision in Jarrett v. State," on the other
hand, is more consistent with the principle that res gestae evidence is
almost always admissible in criminal cases. 171 In Jarrett, defendant
was convicted of driving under the influence even though the arresting
officer did not actually see him operating the vehicle. Rather, the
investigating officer charged defendant after defendant's nephew stated
that defendant was driving the vehicle. 176 The trial court permitted
the police officer to testify about the nephew's statement even though
the nephew was not present at trial. The trial court concluded, and the
court of appeals agreed, that the police officer's testimony was admissible because defendant was present when it was presented and voiced no
objection to the nephew's statement. This, the court of appeals held,
constituted a tacit admission.1 77 The supreme court granted certiorari
and reached the same result, but for a different reason. 17 Concerned
with the constitutional implications of permitting a jury to draw any
inference based on a defendant's silence, the court held that "a witness
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 371-72, 448 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 372, 448 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. (quoting Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 227-28, 290 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1982)).
Id., 448 S.E.2d at 38-39.
Id., 448 S.E.2d at 38.
Id., 448 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
Id. at 373, 448 S.E.2d at 39.
265 Ga. 28, 453 S.E.2d 461 (1995).
See id.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 462.
Id.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 461.
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in a criminal trial may not testify as to a declarant's statements based
on the acquiescence or silence of the accused." 79 However, the court
nevertheless affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence
was admissible under the res gestae doctrine.1 8s Similarly, in Stovall
v. State' 81 the court of appeals held that the trial court properly
admitted-pursuant to the res gestae doctrine-the testimony of a police
officer about a statement made to him by a robbery victim forty-five
minutes after the crime was committed. 182
The validity of the first principle-that the res gestae doctrine does
not apply in civil cases-is demonstrated by the court of appeals decision
in Gordon County Farm v. Maloney."s In Maloney, a workers' compensation case, the claimant proved through her own testimony that as a
result of her injury she was unable to find employment elsewhere and
that a prospective employer refused to hire her when he learned that she
was receiving workers' compensation benefits."s The court of appeals
granted the employer's application for discretionary review and
reversed. 8 ' In response to the claimant's argument that the prospective employer's statement was admissible as part of res gestae, the court
offered a rarely seen definition of res gestae. Res gestae, the court
wrote, includes: "(1) statements of present sense impressions; (2) excited
utterances; (3) statements of present bodily conditions; and (4) statements of present mental states and emotions."'
Because the manager's statement indicating a refusal to hire claimant did not fall into one
of these
categories, it was not admissible under the res gestae excep87
tion.'
B.

PriorStatements
Georgia has two rather unusual rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses. In Gibbons v. State,' the supreme
court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible
as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to cross-examina-

179. Id. at 29, 453 S.E.2d at 463 (emphasis added).

180. Id. at 29-30, 453 S.E.2d at 463.
181.

216 Ga. App. 138, 453 S.E.2d 110 (1995).

182. Id. at 139, 453 S.E.2d at 112,
183. 214 Ga. App. 253, 447 S.E.2d 623 (1994), cert. granted.
184. Id. at 253, 447 S.E.2d at 624.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 254,447 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Brantley v. State, 262 Ga. 786, 790 n.4, 427
S.E.2d 758 n.4 (1993)).
187. Id.
188. 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
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tion.' 9 In Cuzzort v. State,9 ' the supreme court, in apparent frustration over the inability to secure convictions in child molestation cases
prior to the enactment of the child hearsay statute, held that a prior
consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence against an
accused
if the witness is present at trial and subject to cross-examina1
9

tion.1

In view of Cuzzort's genesis as an aid to prosecutors in child molestation cases, it is ironic that in Harper v. State,192 the court of appeals
reversed defendant's conviction for child molestation because the trial
court refused to permit defendant's attorney's secretary to testify about
an alleged pretrial statement made by the victim that was consistent
with the victim's trial testimony that her father had not molested
her.93

Both Gibbons and Cuzzort require that the declarant be subject to
cross-examination." 9
Thus, in Barksdale v. State,' the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred when, in reliance on Gibbons and
Cuzzort, it permitted the prosecution to play the videotaped testimony
of a codefendant incriminating defendant after the codefendant refused
to testify, claiming that he feared retribution,'
The court held that
codefendant's refusal to testify meant there was no trial testimo7
ny-consistent or inconsistent-with the pretrial statement.19
Consequently, the segment could not be admitted as a prior inconsistent
statement. 9s
As discussed below, the court of appeals in Foster v. State'99 held
that the trial court erroneously admitted, under the child hearsay
statute, hearsay evidence of a child.2°° Relying on Gibbons and
Cuzzort, the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed defendant's
conviction." 1
The victim's statement to a detective, which was

189. Id. at 862, 286 S.E.2d at 721.
190. 254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
191. Id. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662.
192. 213 Ga. App. 505, 445 S.E.2d 548 (1994).
193. Id. at 507, 445 S.E.2d at 549.
194. See 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); 254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
195. 265 Ga. 9, 453 S.E.2d 2 (1995).
196. Id. at 11, 453 S.E.2d at 4.
197. Id.
198. Id. The court went further to hold that the admission of the statement violated
defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, reasoning that the defendant's
absolute refusal to testify made him unavailable for cross-examination. Id. at 13, 453
S.E.2d at 5.
199. 216 Ga. App. 26, 453 S.E.2d 482 (1994).
200. Id. at 28, 453 S.E.2d at 484.
201. Id. at 29, 453 S.E.2d at 485.
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arguably inconsistent with her trial testimony, was admissible under
Gibbons."2 The victim's statements to a school counselor were consistent with her trial testimony and thus were admissible under Cuzzort.20 3

C.

Child Hearsay Statute
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-16 provides for the admission of out-of-court
statements made by a child concerning abuse suffered by the child.2"
This limitation-that the declarant must be the victim of the
abuse-was illustrated in the supreme court's decision in Thornton v.
State.2 " In Thornton, the trial court admitted the out-of-court statement of a twelve year old relative of the victim concerning defendant's
alleged abuse. The relative stated that he saw defendant physically
abuse his cousins.2 Because the declarant was not a victim of sexual
molestation or physical abuse, the supreme
court easily, although
20 7
conviction.
defendant's
reversed
reluctantly,
The child hearsay statute applies only to statements made by a child
under the age of fourteen."' In Foster v.State20 9 the trial court
admitted the hearsay testimony of a fifteen year old victim based upon
evidence that, because of mental deficiencies, the child's intellectual
abilities and social skills were equivalent to those of a child younger
than fourteen. 2 0 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
statute, by its plain language, permits the admission of hearsay
testimony of children only if they are under the chronological age of
fourteen years at the time of the alleged act. 1
D. Business Records Exception
During the survey period, the court of appeals reaffirmed that
Georgia's business records exception to the hearsay rule,212 unlike the
Federal Rules of Evidence business records exception, does not permit
the admission of opinions contained in business records. 13

202.
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205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
264 Ga. 563, 449 S.E.2d 98 (1994).
Id. at 564, 449 S.E.2d at 104.
Id. at 566, 449 S.E.2d at 106.
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O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
216 Ga. App. 26, 453 S.E.2d 482 (1994).
Id. at 28, 453 S.E.2d at 484.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 484-85.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 (1995).
Dickens v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 214 Ga. App. 490, 448 S.E.2d 237 (1994).
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AUTHENTICATION

Berky,2 14

In State v.
a closely divided court of appeals rendered a
significant decision relating to the authentication requirements for
videotapes. In Berky, the State planned to use a videotape of defendant
to prove its case. Tragically, the officer who shot the videotape, which
allegedly depicted defendant driving under the influence, was killed in
an unrelated incident and, therefore, the State was unable to authenticate the videotape because no witness was available to testify that the
videotape accurately depicted defendant driving drunk. Accordingly, the
trial court dismissed the charges against defendant.21
The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that, under the
traditional rules for the authentication of videotapes, the State could
never authenticate the videotape because of the arresting officer's
death.216 However, the majority was concerned by this result in view
of the "strong public interest in protecting the citizens of Georgia from
drunk drivers and in supporting the prosecution of such." 17 Moreover,
videotaped evidence can be extremely important and, in many instances,
is more reliable than eyewitness testimony.
Traditionally, photographic evidence has been admitted to portray the
testimony of witnesses. Thus, photographs and videotapes can be
authenticated if a witness testifies that the photographs accurately
depict something that he saw. However, advances in technology have
led many courts to allow photographs and videotapes into evidence even
though a witness is unable to authenticate the evidence under the
traditional rules of authentication. In the latter situation, the photograph or videotape "constitutes independent probative evidence of what
it shows." 1 ' The court of appeals termed this the "silent witness"
rationale for admitting such evidence.21 Noting that many jurisdictions have adopted the silent witness theory, the court of appeals
expressly adopted the silent witness theory for admission of videotapes.22 To authenticate the videotape, it is only necessary to establish, through expert testimony, that the videotape has not been altered,

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

214 Ga. App. 174, 447 S.E.2d 147 (1994), cert. granted.
Id. at 174, 447 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 175, 447 S.E.2d at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177, 447 S.E.2d at 150.

1995]

EVIDENCE

the date and place the videotape was taken, and the "identity of the
relevant participants depicted."221
Writing for four dissenting judges, Judge Banke criticised the majority
for abandoning a "well-settled rule of evidence, apparently in reaction to
event of the arresting officer's subsequent death in the line
the pathetic
22 2
of duty."

223
The court of appeals faced this issue again in Freeman v. State .
In Freeman, the court of appeals held that the trial court properly
admitted a television news videotape of a drug transaction in which
defendant was allegedly involved.224 The majority expressly relied on
Berky and the silent witness theory even though the photographer who
shot the videotape testified at trial. 25 Judge Smith concurred specially and criticised the majority for its "tacit expansion" of the silent
witness rule.226 Judge Smith argued that Berky should be limited to
cases of necessity, and it was not necessary to apply Berky to the
be both
present case. 227 "Any expansion of the rule in Berky should
225
explicit and required by the facts of the case presented."

221. Id. at 176, 447 S.E.2d at 149.
222. Id. at 178,447 S.E.2d at 150 (Birdsong & McMurray, PJJ,, Banke & Johnson, JJ.,
dissenting).
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216 Ga. App. 319, 454 S.E.2d 196 (1995).
Id. at 321, 454 S.E.2d at 198.
Id., 454 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 322, 454 S.E.2d at 198 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.

